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Abstract
Firewalls, especially at large organizations, process high velocity internet traffic and flag suspicious events and activities.
Flagged events can be benign, such as misconfigured routers, or malignant, such as a hacker trying to gain access to a
specific computer. Confounding this is that flagged events are not always obvious in their danger and the high velocity
nature of the problem. Current work in firewall log analysis is manual intensive and involves manpower hours to find
events to investigate. This is predominantly achieved by manually sorting firewall and intrusion detection/prevention
system log data. This work aims to improve the ability of analysts to find events for cyber forensics analysis. A tabulated
vector approach is proposed to create meaningful state vectors from time-oriented blocks. Multivariate and graphical
analysis is then used to analyze state vectors in human–machine collaborative interface. Statistical tools, such as the
Mahalanobis distance, factor analysis, and histogram matrices, are employed for outlier detection. This research also
introduces the breakdown distance heuristic as a decomposition of the Mahalanobis distance, by indicating which
variables contributed most to its value. This work further explores the application of the tabulated vector approach
methodology on collected firewall logs. Lastly, the analytic methodologies employed are integrated into embedded
analytic tools so that cyber analysts on the front-line can efficiently deploy the anomaly detection capabilities.
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Introduction
Due to the constantly changing behavior of cyberattacks, reactive approaches are desirable to detect
and prevent malicious actors from gaining access to
networks. Firewalls and intrusion detection and prevention systems (IDPS) are a line of defense in identifying and stopping suspicious internet traffic. When a
suspicious event occurs, these devices generate a log file
containing details of what preprogrammed rules were
violated and how it was handled.1 Such log files contain
details of the event, e.g. source and destination IP
addresses, port numbers, and protocols, but not the
packet and data that led to the event. Of interest is
cyber/digital forensics of logged events to understand
their origin and magnitude.2,3 Suspicious events include
both malicious and non-malicious activities, e.g. misconfigured routers; however, each event is logged and

to find malicious events for further analysis, one must
search through all logged suspicious events.
Although advances have been made in applying text
mining and advanced analytics to cyber log data
analysis, c.f. Suh-Lee et al.4 Breier and Branisová5
and Villa et al.,6 the characteristics of cyber logs results
in much manual analysis for interpretation and
response.7–10 When considering log data, cyber analysts
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rely on manual sorting and experiential knowledge to
find possible threats in logged events to further investigate.7,11,12 Thus, cyber security is heavily experientialbased and uses the innate ability of humans to process
large amounts of complex data;13 similarly experience
is critical and novice analysts might miss intrusions and
events that a veteran analyst would not.14 Additionally,
cyber intrusion detection is asymmetrical in nature
whereby an attacker can focus on only one threat
approach while a defender (cyber analyst) must constantly protect all systems and prepare for many different types of attacks, vulnerabilities and threats.15
Although system administrators and cyber analysts
manually handle log data, this is becoming increasingly
infeasible due to the big data nature of cyber traffic
(unstructured, high volume and high velocity16).
Normal behavior for cyber networks is generally not
well defined and changes over time, resulting in high
false positive detection rates.17 Additionally, since firewall log events are the result of network abnormalities,
one is thus necessarily interested in detecting the anomalies within the anomalies. Related research, c.f.
Lazarevic et al.,18 Denning,19 Garcıa-Teodoro et al.,20
Grimaila et al.,21 Moore et al.,22 Dube et al.,23
Shilland,24 Shen et al.,25 Stewart et al.26 has focused
on anomaly detection at the device/software level,
with little21,27–32 exploration into anomaly detection
in the log files generated from the preexisting devices
or software.
For analysis, data were used from a large scale distributed network with regional data nodes much like
the Microsoft Cyber Defense Center, the Verizon
Network Operations Center, or AT&T Global
Network Operations Center. Currently, data is
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analyzed from enterprise-wide networks, which rely
on a series of firewalls and IDPS to identify and stop
intrusions. These devices, when triggered, generate a
log file containing details of how it handled each incident, such as the source and destination IP addresses,
port numbers, protocols, bytes transferred, etc.
However, due to the wide variety of devices adding
observations to the log, the data can be highly variable.
In operation, analysts employ an experiential approach
whereby large log files are manually sorted to find
anomalies to further investigate; this process is conceptualized in Figure 1(a). However, due to the large size
of the network and quantity of users, the data is of
significant volume and emerging at high velocity; thus
representative of a big data problem. Currently, analysts inspect numerous potential incidents on a daily
basis, but have neither the time nor the resources available to analyze all incidents contained in the logs.
This paper combines statistical and visual
methods and integrates them into embedded
analytic applications to assist analysts in the manual
analysis of firewall logs. To this end, the authors develop a tabulated vector approach (TVA) that processes
firewall log files to identify anomalies within the
flagged firewall log event data. The TVA process
employed by the authors is similar to that of Winding
et al.,27 wherein pre-defined data attributes are considered. The developed process is automated and data
attributes are transformed into representative counts,
e.g. the number of times a certain IP address appears
within the timespan of interest. Descriptive statistics
are then computed for these counts with the result
being the tabulated vector for a given period of
time period.

Figure 1. Cyber firewall log analysis methods: (a) Standard, manual intensive, cyber anomaly detection approach; (b) proposed
methodology for analyst-aided multivariate firewall log anomaly detection.

Gutierrez et al.
The authors propose an analyst-aided solution to
cue system administrators and analysts to anomalies
for further analysis when manual log file analysis and
forensics are employed. The end goal is that seen in
Figure 1(b), wherein log files are selected, these are
then divided into time blocks. From here, tabulated
vectors are computed for the time blocks. These tabulated vectors are then processed through statistical and
graphical methods. Finally, analysts are cued to
various blocks of interest within a given log data file.
The purpose of this approach is to efficiently analyze
abnormal activities so that cyber analysts can dedicate
their time to researching potential threats.
This paper is organized as follows: “Background”
section reviews background details on cyber networks,
cyber threats, and cyber technologies. “Developing a statistical framework for cyber anomaly detection” section
3 presents statistical pattern recognition methods that
consider handling unstructured data through numerical
approaches. “TVA for firewall log analysis” section discusses the development of a framework to detect firewall
log anomalies. “Embedded analytics” section discusses
how the proposed methodology was embedded into analytic applications for use by cyber analysts, and
“Conclusions” section concludes the paper.

Background
In order to analyze cyber log data, one must discuss the
basics of cyber networks, firewalls, IDPS, and characteristics of cyber log data. In this paper, we will discuss
the salient characteristics of these areas.

Figure 2. Generic cyber network.
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Cyber networks
Figure 2 presents a conceptualization of a basic cyber
network where user PCs are protected by an intrusion
detection system (IDS) or intrusion prevention system
(IPS), collectively IDPS, and a firewall.33 Each security
device plays a crucial role in protecting the user’s computer from outside and inside threats. Both IDPS and
firewalls monitor network traffic and either stop or flag
events that violate their rules. When an event triggers a
rule, details are logged along with the action taken by
the firewall or IDPS.
Firewalls. Firewalls provide a first level of protection
between an internal (e.g. local area network (LAN))
and external (e.g. internet) network. Firewalls employ
rules to determine the outcome of an event34 and prevent risks, including: (1) an internal host system’s exposure to inherently insecure Internet protocols and
services, and (2) probes and attacks launched from
hosts on the Internet.35 A wide variety of firewalls
exist, including both commercially developed and
open source systems.36 Presently, firewalls employed
in the operational network of interest include those
manufactured by Palo Alto Networks, Cisco ASA,
McAfee, and Norton 360.
Firewalls are of three general types:35 (1) packet filtering (PF), (2) proxy gateway, and (3) circuit level
inspection. In brief, PF firewalls consider each incoming and outgoing packet, apply predefined rules to analyze the packet and decide to allow it to proceed
or not.35 Proxy gateways, also known as servers, act
as a security filter.35 Circuit level inspection firewalls
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use a proxy server that employs an access control list to
determine if a request is permitted.

Intrusion detection/prevention systems (IDPS)
Intrusion detection involves monitoring and logging
network traffic to detect attempts to gain unauthorized
network access which are evident by security policy
violations and acceptable use policy.37 Intrusion prevention goes one step further by attempting to stop
such incidents. Therefore, IDPS must identify possible
incidents and when one occurs, a log of information
about the event and the course of action is generated.37
Similar to firewalls, IDPS employs a set of rules related
to signatures or anomalies.37 IDPSs can be setup in
two ways, host based (HIDS) or network based
(NIDS), where the former is deployed on each individual computer while the latter is positioned along
the network.37

Cyber anomaly detection in firewall logs
While one could find that a given firewall log file contains entirely malicious events, one likely has the problem of too many false positives in the log data. False
positive issues in cyber anomaly detection involve too
many benign events being logged and thus obscuring
the rare malicious activities.38 Since firewall logs contain anomalous events detected within network traffic
and since many of these are not threats from attackers,
one is thus interested in finding anomalies among
anomalies. Two general paradigms exist for this task:
(i) experiential, or manually searching through logs
based on subjective experiences and (ii) statistical or
machine learning approaches to find observations of
interest in the log data.

Experiential approaches
In general, the work of cyber analysts is manual intensive and involves queries and searches of a dataset.7,11
Experiential approaches work by taking a log files,
employing various sorting and analysis tools (e.g.
Snort and Kibana), and incorporating contextual
information to understand an event.11 The process is
conceptualized in Figure 1(a), where only two column
searches are considered, which illustrates the manual
nature of sorting by individual columns until one
finds observations that display suspicious behavior.
While such an approach could be highly accurate, it
is time consuming and requires a year or more of on
the job experience11 and learning of various firewall
forensics attributes.39
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Statistical data analysis
Statistical data analysis involves using mathematical
approaches to find patterns in datasets.13,40
Approaches for doing so range from supervised
(known classes/groups in the data) to unsupervised
(unknown classes/groups in the data). Statistical data
analysis thus includes classification methods where
classes are known, at least in the training data, to clustering methods for which classes are unknown and one
aims to find groupings in the data.13 In cyber analysis,
one can divide the field into academic and operational
approaches. While academic approaches to cyber analysis frequently have the luxury of knowing if behaviors
are threats or not, c.f. Grimaila et al.,21 Moore et al.,22
operational cyber analysis does not have the luxury of
canonical truth. Thus, statistical analysis of cyber data
is frequently unsupervised in operation.
Since a variety of methods have been proposed to
analyze firewall logs via statistical or machine learning
methods, of interest is thus leveraging past concepts
and ideas to create a method to aid analysts in analyzing and interpreting firewall log data. A variety of
approaches exist in this domain, c.f. Lazarevic
et al.,18 Garcıa-Teodoro et al.,20 and include text analytics,41 support vector machines,18 random forests,42
event correlation,21,30,43–46 dynamic rule creation,29
and principal component analysis.20,47,48 Of particular
interest is the work of Denning,49 who originally
proposed using anomaly detection methods in cyber
security. This has been consistently extended and
expanded upon, as seen in Lazarevic et al.,18 GarcıaTeodoro et al.,20 Zhang and Zulkernine,42 Shyu et al.,47
Wang and Battiti,48 Lazarevic et al.,50 Ahmed et al.,51
Liao et al.,1 and Patcha and Park.52

Cyber network and data of interest
Of interest to the authors are general firewall log files,
one task is handling all firewall logs from the many
networks the enterprise has worldwide. For context,
the operational approach to the data collection process
is conceptualized in Figure 3. For data handling, raw
logs are first normalized into a structured data file by a
connector, a stand-alone device or software that forwards data and sometimes converts from one format to
another. These are then forwarded to regional centers
(RC). RCs are organizations that provide regional
services while simultaneously defending the network
from cyber threats.53 At the RCs, a regional security
information and event management (SIEM) device
aggregates, correlates, monitors, and generates alerts
from the received data. Next, a second connector forwards the data to a global SIEM known as the integration center (IC). After the data is reprocessed at the IC,
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Figure 3. Generic representation of the data collection hierarchy.

it is then uploaded into a big data platform—a centralized database for managing big data,7 both structured
and unstructured, at high volume and high velocity.16
From here, data can be queried and analyzed.

Developing a statistical framework
for cyber anomaly detection
In order to develop a statistical framework for firewall
log analysis, the authors posit that a multivariate dataset containing only numeric values is necessary. To this
aim, the authors work towards feature vector creation
and then statistical and graphical analysis of this feature vector.

Feature vector creation
One technique to facilitate the application of statistical
methods to log files is the feature vector method proposed by Winding et al.,27 and further applied in Breier
and Branisova29 Syurahbil et al.54 This approach
aggregates log file observations into a set of feature
vectors, which can then be analyzed through statistical
approaches, which require the data to be numeric. In
brief, a feature vector is a count of occurrences for the
unique values in a set of variables.27 Inherently, this
involves dividing the data into blocks or regions of
sequential observations.
A conceptualization is presented in Figure 4. In
Figure 4(a), we have an example of two columns of
raw data in a given block. Field A is categorical
and field B is numeric. A feature vector can be created
by condensing these observations into a block row,

Figure 4(b). Unique categorical features in field A
become columns of block 1. The count of each
unique categorical feature in that block then becomes
the value. Numerical entries in field B the original
data are then summed with that value placed in the
column for B.
When applying the feature vector approach to firewall log data, Winding et al.,27 took log file records
with the following raw data fields:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Repeated attempts of access by a single IP,
Number of source IPs per destination IP,
Number of destination IPs per source IP,
Number of destination ports on a given source/
destination IP pair,
Unique IPs,
Maximum activity from a single IP,
Failed and successful connections from the same IP,
Attempts to access invalid IPs,
Inbound/Outbound bytes per unit time.

and then condensed these into feature vectors with the
following variables:
• Source IP address, number of destination
IP addresses,
• Destination IP, number of failed access attempts,
• Source IP, destination IP,
• Destination perspective vector (destination IP, count
of source IPs, number of successful accesses, number
of failed accesses, count of destination ports,
number of bytes transferred (inbound), number of
bytes transferred (outbound)).
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Figure 4. Generic feature vector creation process. (a) Example raw data; (b) resultant feature vector.

Mahalanobis based anomaly detection

Principal components and factor analysis

To find anomalies inside a feature vector, one approach
is the Mahalanobis distance, which is a multivariate
outlier detection expression, which compares each
observation by its distance from the data mean, independent of scale.55 The Mahalanobis distance is computed as

Principal components analysis (PCA) is a linear transformation method which involves computing the data
covariance, or correlation, matrix eigen-solution projecting the data by these eigenvectors.56 The resultant
projection is of uncorrelated components, with each
component explaining successively less variation in
the data, per the eigenvalues.56 PCA is a dimensionality
reduction method because one can select a small
amount of components which explain a large amount
of the variance in the data. PCA was applied to IDPS
event analysis by Garcia-Teodoro et al.;20 Shyu et al.,47
proposed using minor components (those whose variance explained is less than 0.20), claiming that their
method can distinguish whether an outlier is an
extreme value or it does not have the same correlation
structure as the “normal” data.
Similar to PCA, factor analysis (FA) is another
dimensionality reduction technique designed to identify
underlying structure of the data. FA relates the correlations between variables through a set of factors to
link together seemingly unrelated variables.56,57
An additional step seen in FA is that it can rotate the
original solution seen in PCA, in order to possibly find
more structure in the data. The basic FA model is

MD ¼

pﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
ðx  x ÞC1 ðx  x Þ

(1)

where x is a vector of p observations, x ¼ ðx1 ; . . . ; xp Þ,
x is the mean vector of the data, x ¼ ðx1 ; . . . ; xp Þ, and
C1 is the inverse data covariance matrix.55 Once
computed, MD values can be sorted with anomalies
identified by relative magnitudes.

Breakdown distance
However, one limitation is using MD is that it does not
provide a rationale for what is or is not an anomaly.
Therefore, we propose the use of a “breakdown distance” (BD)


 ðxi  xi Þ 

BDi ¼  pﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ 
Cii

(2)

where xi is a given variable, xi is the mean of the variable, and Cii is the variance of xi. The advantage of
equation (2) is that scaling by variance enables one
to measure of the relative contribution of each variable
to MD scores.

X ¼ Kf þ e

(3)

where X is the vector of responses
X¼ ðx1 ; . . . ; xp Þ, f

are the common factors f ¼ f1 ; . . . ; fq , e is the unique
factors e ¼ ðe1 ; . . . ; ep Þ, and K is the factor loadings.56
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For the desired results, this research uses the correlation matrix. Factor loadings are correlations between
the factors and the original data and can thus range
from 1 to 1, which indicate how much that factor
affects each variable.56 Values close to 0 imply a
weak effect on the variable.
A factor loading matrix can be computed to understand how each original data variable is related to the
resultant factors.56 This can be computed as
qﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
pﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
K¼
k1 e1 ; . . . ; kp ep

IFS level

Evaluation

In the 0.90s
In the 0.80s
In the 0.70s
In the 0.60s
In the 0.50s
Below 0.50

Marvelous
Meritorious
Middling
Mediocre
Miserable
Unacceptable

IFS: index of factorial simplicity.

(4)

where ki is the eigenvalue for each factor, ei is the eigenvector for each factor, and p is the number of columns.56 Factor scores are used to examine the
behavior of the observations relative to each factor.
This research will plot factor scores against one another as a method for anomaly detection. Using equation
(4), the scores are calculated as
b
f ¼ X s R1 K

Table 1. Kaiser’s evaluation of the IFS levels.61

(5)

where Xs is the standardized observations, R1 is the
inverse of the correlation matrix, and K is the factor
loadings matrix.56 To simplify the results for interpretation, the factor loadings can undergo an orthogonal
or oblique rotation.58 Orthogonal rotations assume
independence between the factors while oblique rotations allow the factors to correlate. For this research,
we utilize the most common rotation option known as
varimax.59 Varimax rotates the factors orthogonally to
maximize the variance of the squared factor loadings
which forces large factors to increase and small ones to
decrease, providing easier interpretation.
To assess the quality of a factor analysis solution,
Kaiser60 proposed the index of factorial simplicity
(IFS) that measures the tendency towards unifactoriality for both a given row and the entire matrix as a
whole. Computing IFS values consistent with
Kaiser,60 we can evaluate the quality for a factor analysis solution with the heuristic labels shown in Table 1.
Since the purpose of factor analysis is for dataset
reduction, we consider the three generally accepted
methods of determining the dimensionality for correlation matrix inputs.56,61 The first and most commonly
used is Kaiser’s Criterion62 which advises to retain
those factors whose eigenvalues are greater than 1.0.
Second is Cattell’s scree test63 which involves graphing
the eigenvalues and retaining those that form the steep
curve. The third method is a modified scree test called
Horn’s parallel analysis (i.e. Horn’s Curve),64 that uses
a Monte Carlo simulation to find the average eigenvalues. Due to the advantages of Horn’s parallel analysis,

the authors employed this method herein to determine
the number of factors to explore.

Visualizations
Graphical analytic tools enable an analyst to visualize
insights that may not be readily apparent without manually examining the data.65 Appropriate visualizations
are key to cyber data analysis, c.f. Schweitzer and
Fulton,66 thus the authors present a selection of methods which will be employed to help analysts tell a story
in firewall log data.

Heatmaps
Heatmaps are graphical representations of a data matrix
through the use of a color scale and have been used for
100þ years as an effective visualization approach for a
matrix.67 In statistics, one common use for heatmaps is
for correlation matrices, illustrating the relationship
between variables ranging from 1 to 1.

Histogram matrix
A histogram matrix (HMAT) is a visualization technique developed by Frei and Rennhard,28 that combines graphical and statistical techniques to aid
security administrators in efficiently identifying anomalies. HMAT was designed to scan large log files that
show steady normal behavior and examine the messages displayed for each observation. HMAT extends
both heatmaps and histograms, where data values are
represented through a series of circles on a grid with the
radius directly corresponding to the magnitude.28
An example HMAT relative to log files is presented
in Figure 5 (taken from Frei and Rennhard28); here
HMAT visualizes time on the x-axis, and the number
of words per message on the y-axis. The size of the
circle in Figure 5 is related to the number of log messages with the corresponding number of words while
the color serves as indication to the relative likelihood
of the time slot. The authors in Frei and Rennhard28
determined the color of a circle by comparing the distribution of the sizes of the circles in its column with
previous columns. In Figure 5, the large red circle
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Figure 5. Histogram matrix of mail server message distribution, from Abbott et al.14

indicates an unusually large amount of messages, greater than 5 standard deviations from the norm. HMAT
also provides user interaction, where an administrator
can click on one of the circles to reveal all the log
messages that define that circle.

from “Developing a statistical framework for cyber
anomaly detection” section can be assembled into a
cohesive firewall log analysis framework. Then the
authors will illustrate the utility of their framework
with an example case study.

Network graphs
Network graphs are graphical models that depict a
relationship between two or more nodes, connected
by edges.68,69 Herein, the authors employ network
graphs to illustrate the interaction between source
and destination IP addresses. Of particular interest
are identifying The Onion Router (TOR) related IP
addresses, port scans, and network fingerprinting
attempts. TOR is a network of servers that provides
a user with anonymity by relaying their internet traffic
through multiple encrypted servers.70,71 Probable TOR
nodes can be found and might be related to attempts to
access multiple computers. A port scan is the act of
determining which ports on a network are open and
is thus related with one source IP connecting to many
destination IPs over a short amount of time.72,73
Finally, fingerprinting a network is the act of revealing
the presence of cyber security devices.73 Thus, each
unique IP address is a node. An edge represents the
interaction between sources and destinations with its
thickness denoting the frequency of interactions
between the nodes. For related work, see Swanson.74

TVA for firewall log analysis
Assembling the statistical methods from “Developing a
statistical framework for cyber anomaly detection” section together involves a systems engineering approach.
Here, the authors will show how the statistical methods

TVA approach and process
When incorporating the statistical, graphical, and analytical methods discussed in “Developing a statistical
framework for cyber anomaly detection” section, the
conceptualization that appeared in Figure 1(b) yields
the flow chart seen in Figure 6. Figure 6 presents a
representation of the methodology used operationally
to exploit log data is presented. This process in Figure 6
is broken up into four subsections: pre-processing,
within block analytics, across block analytics, and
graphical analytics. Pre-processing takes the raw data
and transforms it into a form that can be used for statistical analysis. Statistical analysis utilizes the statistical tools described in “Developing a statistical
framework for cyber anomaly detection” section to
build the HMAT for anomaly detection. Moving to
within block analytics, histograms are utilized to compare the data between blocks in time. Across block
analytics assesses the entire dataset for similarities or
differences while graphical analytics focuses on determining the link between observations and IP addresses.
Developing a data analysis platform also involved systems engineering to select and incorporate available
packages and tools for functionality. R75 was used
due to its growing popularity and open source
nature;76 additionally, R is further available as a software tool for big data platforms.
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Figure 6. Multivariate and graphical approach to firewall log anomaly detection.

TVA example case study
To illustrate the utility of the proposed firewall log
anomaly detection process, the authors will examine a
representative log file with 39,304 observations and
400þ data features. Due to the nature of the data sources, IP address and data fields have been obfuscated to
permit the presentation of real data results. Thus, IP
addresses will not be in the traditional XXX.XXX.XX.
XXX format, obfuscated values will appear in figures
and nondescript names (e.g., 239e330c.4c3e44ed.
f54890e4.1a9d80ce) will appear in the text.
Additionally, data fields will be vague and generic.

Data pre-processing
Once data is retrieved, the data must be pre-processed
and then time regional blocks are created, from which
state vectors are extracted and data quality is considered (e.g. multicollinearity adjustments). These steps
are necessary to incorporate multivariate and graphical
methods for anomaly detection. In this step, variables
of interest are either selected or created to aid in the
discovery of anomalies.
The data used in this research has been collected
from sensors located around the world. While over
400 data fields are collected, for illustrated purposes
this research focuses on the fields shown in Table 2.
These fields were selected based on (i) commonality
between multiple log files and (ii) their ease on

Table 2. Dataset variables.
Field name

Description

Device Vendor
Device Product
Source Address
Destination Address
Transport Protocol
Bytes In
Bytes Out
Category Outcome
Country_Name

Company who made the device
Name of the security device
IP address of the source
IP address of the destination
Transport protocol used
Number of bytes transferred in
Number of bytes transferred out
Action taken by the device
Country of the source IP address

demonstrating the proposed methodology without the
use of text mining techniques. Since some device vendors can have multiple products, we combine the fields
Device_Vendor and Device_Product to form a new variable Device_Name to avoid confusion between the
device the observation originated from.

Time block creation
Following pre-processing and data cleaning, one then
creates time regional blocks. Here, the observations are
divided into sequential time blocks of equal length. The
39,304 observations in the example log file were chronologically separated into 136 time blocks, each containing 289 observations. Figure 7 shows the
categorical variables being labeled as factors while
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Figure 7. Sample of time block creation.
Table 3. Example state vector matrix.

1
2
3
4
5.
..

ICMP

No protocol

TCP

UDP

/Attempt

/Failure

/Success

No outcome

Country 1

Country 10

Country 11

1
0
0
0
0.
..

254
264
247
267
..236
.

22
16
16
12
..14
.

12
9
26
10
12
..
.

17
41
0
74
33
..
.

67
38
41
25
22
..
.

82
106
75
114
70
..
.

123
104
173
76
..164
.

0
0
0
0
..0
.

0
0
0
0
..0
.

0
0
1
0
..0
.

numerical variables being labeled as numeric (integer,
double, long, etc.). The number of levels associated
with a categorical variable then denote the number of
unique entries. For example, the Device_Name variable
has 19 levels in the example log file, indicating that
there are 19 different devices found in this dataset.

State vector creation
From the time blocks, numerical matrices are extracted
to prepare for statistical analysis. To apply the statistical methods discussed in “Developing a statistical
framework for cyber anomaly detection” section, we
employ TVA, which uses the feature vector creation
method of “Feature vector creation” section to take
the pre-defined data attributes and transform them
into representative counts using descriptive statistics.
Therefore, as each time block is generated, the categorical fields are separated by their levels and a count of
occurrences for each level is recorded into a vector. All
numerical fields, such as bytes in and bytes out, are
recorded as a summation within the time block. Due
to the large number of levels associated with IP
addresses, only the top 10 source and destination IP
address counts are recorded. These vectors are then
aggregated into a single matrix, known as the state
vector matrix, as seen in Table 3. In Table 3, one sees
rows for time blocks 1–5 with a count of occurrences
for each device found in the data.

Multicollinearity adjustment
Prior to any statistical analysis, we automatically
inspect the state vector for multicollinearity issues.

This prevents us from inadvertently having issues
such as matrix singularity, rank deficiency, and strong
correlation values; this also removes any columns that
pose an issue. The conclusion of this step ensures the
data is ready for statistical analysis.
Before the statistical tools, mentioned in
“Developing a statistical framework for cyber anomaly
detection” section, are applied to the state vector
matrix, the columns of the state vector matrix must
meet three criteria: (1) the columns must have a variance greater than 0 þ D1 to avoid matrix singularity,
where D1  0.1; (2) the columns must be linearly independent to avoid computational errors associated with
rank deficiency, consistent with;60 (3) the values of the
correlation matrix cannot exceed a threshold of 1  D2,
where D2 ¼ 0.05. The identified columns are removed
and the reduced state vector matrix is ready for multivariate analysis.

Statistical analysis
Once the data has been pre-processed and made to
conform to general data quality expectations, our
data is ready for analysis. First we can build the
HMAT to serve as the foundation to subsequent analysis. From here, the further analysis is analyst driven
whereby three directions can be explored: within block
analytics, across block analytics, and graphical analytics.
The HMAT in this research utilizes the squared
Mahalanobis distance as an outlier detection metric
to determine the color of each time block in the
HMAT.
The
breakdown
distance
enhances
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Figure 8. Histogram matrix (all time blocks).

the HMAT by adjusting the size of the circles according to its normalized value for each variable. Figure 8
shows the HMAT for the entire dataset, where each
row refers to a time block and each column represents
a variable. Using the Mahalanobis distance, the anomalous time blocks are distinguished by the darker shade
of blue. Then, to determine the size of the circle, we
normalize the breakdown distance for each column to
distinguish which variables contributed most to the
Mahalanobis distance value within each time block.
Thus, from Figure 8, we can observe the big picture
of potentially concentrated anomalies. The rows that
are shaded darker imply that they are anomalies relative to their MD. Then the columns that have larger

circles indicate those variables that are driving the MD
for that particular time block. Looking at Figure 8,
we identify the clearest anomalies shown in the lighter
blue with the largest circle as blocks 14, 27, 44, and 63.
We also recognize instances where sequential rows
appear in the top 20 time blocks, which suggests that
the block size may be too small. Moving forward with
our case study approach, we select block 14 for further
investigation.

Statistical analysis: Within blocks analytics
Once a time block has been selected for analysis,
we first explore within block analytics through the
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Table 4. IFS results.

Original
Rotated

IFS level

Evaluation

0.5674
0.6125

Miserable
Mediocre

IFS: index of factorial simplicity.

Figure 9. Block 14: top 5 breakdown distance columns.

use of histograms, as seen in Figure 9. Here, we compare the counts of observations for particular attributes
within neighboring time blocks. Once an anomalous
time block is detected, histograms are generated to
compare the state vector values relative to neighboring
time blocks. The histogram shown in Figure 9 displays
the frequency of occurrences for the top five columns
with the largest BD value for block 14, relative to the
occurrences for neighboring time blocks. The purpose
is twofold: (1) observe the columns that cause the block
to be an anomaly and (2) take note of the temporal
relationship between the top five columns and the
time blocks.
Based on Figure 9, we further our recommendation
for a larger block size since blocks 13 and 14 both have
high values for Device 2 and the D2 variable. The destination IP address labeled as D2 within block 14 is
destination IP IPAddress1.

Statistical analysis: Across blocks analytics
The next direction we explore in statistical analysis is
across block analytics. Using FA, we first explore the
factor loadings (correlations between the columns of
the state vector matrix and the suggested factors),
then we compare the factor scores against one another
for anomaly detection. To begin using factor analysis,
the dimensions of the reduced state vector matrix are
first passed to the Horn’s curve function to find the
recommended set of eigenvalues. Next, the dimensionality is determined by finding the eigenvalues of the
correlation matrix of the state vector matrix and retaining only those factors whose eigenvalues are greater
than or equal to those produced by Horn’s curve.
The reduced state vector matrix and the number of
factors to retain are passed to the factor analysis function. Then, the factor analysis function generates two
sets of factor scores and factor loadings, unrotated and
rotated. Using the IFS values to assess the quality of
our solutions, we select the set of scores and loadings
associated with the larger IFS value. The factor

loadings are displayed in a correlation heatmap for
interpretation of the variable relationships. The factor
scores for each factor are plotted against one another
for graphical anomaly detection.
After performing factor analysis, we observe the IFS
levels presented in Table 2 to assess the quality of our
factor analysis solutions. The rotated IFS level is
higher than the original IFS level, serving as rationale
for using the rotated factor loadings and scores in the
subsequent analysis. According to Table 4, a value of
0.6125 is deemed as mediocre.
The heatmap in Figure 10 shows the correlation
between the columns of the reduced state vector to
the rotated factor loadings. Strong negative correlations are depicted as red while strong positive correlations are shown as blue. The factor loading breakdown
can provide insight into the relationships between variables based on Figure 10. For example, in factor 5 we
see that the two devices, device 4 and device 13 are
directly related to the geographic variables Country 7
and Country 10. While the true relationship between
these variables is unknown, we may presume that these
devices are set up to capture signatures from those
locations. Looking at factor 1, we notice that four devices as well as the two main protocols are highly correlated with observations coming from the geographic
locations of Country 16, Country 17, Country 18,
and Country 29. It is highly likely that these locations
are associated with known TOR exit nodes.
Interestingly, it also reinforces the relationship seen in
the histogram in Figure 8, where observations sourced
from Country 10 and detected by the Device 13 are
correlated with high occurrences.
The next step of FA involves projecting the data by
the factors. Figure 11 contains four subplots for this
step: the subplot in the top left plots rotated scores 1 on
the x-axis and rotated scored 2 on the y-axis; the subplot in the top right plots rotated scores 3 on the x-axis
and rotated scored 4 on the y-axis; the subplot in the
bottom left plots rotated scores 5 on the x-axis and
rotated scored 6 on the y-axis; the subplot in the
bottom right plots rotated scores 3 on the x-axis and
rotated scored 5 on the y-axis. Although rotated scores
1 explains the most variation in the data, followed by
rotated scores 2 and so on, anomalies are not apparent
until one examines rotated scores 3 and 5. Based on
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Figure 10. Heatmap of rotated factor loadings.

Figure 11. Rotated factor score plots.
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Figure 13. Block 14 IP network cluster investigation.
Figure 12. Block 14 IP network graph.

these plots, we can clearly see the anomalous time
blocks, such as blocks 27, 63, 14, and 44.

Statistical analysis: Graphical analysis
The final analysis direction we examine is graphical
analytics. This encompasses both the HMAT and the
IP network graphs. The purpose of the network graphs
is to visualize the connections between source IP
addresses and the destination IP(s) they attempted to
connect to. While not directly a statistical technique,
this method allows for rapid visual cues to understand
the IP dynamics within the dataset or a specific
time block.
In Figure 12, we display the network graph for time
block 14. At first glance, there is a noticeably large
cluster on the bottom left (circled in red), where multiple nodes are connected to a single node. We take a
closer look at this region in Figure 13. Looking at
Figure 1, we first pinpoint the source IP address asb7fa0888.5aa3beb3.5aa3beb3.5aa3beb3. In the original
data set, the source IP address could not be identified
by the security device, either as a result of misconfiguration or the source masking their IP address. Next,
we skim through the destination IP addresses connected to the focal source IP address. Coincidentally,
we recognize the IP address 239e330c.4c3e44ed.
f54890e4.1a9d80ce (denoted by a red dot), which was
found to be the fifth highest variable causing time block
14 to be an anomaly. Then, we noticed a common
trend, where seven other destination IP addresses
began with 239e330c.4c3e44ed, three of which began
with 239e330c.4c3e44ed.f54890e4. This suggests that
the source IP address in this cluster was either attempting to perform a port scan, or attempting to fingerprint
the network.

Embedded analytics
Analytic capabilities within organizations have, historically, been dominated by proprietary software technologies. Unfortunately, these technologies often lack
availability, innovation, interoperability, flexibility,
and transparency.77 Likewise, to incorporate the analytic approach herein illustrated into existing proprietary software used by cyber analysts would take
significant resources (i.e. time, money) of which most
organizations have little to spare. In recent years, there
has been an increased transition away from proprietary
software and towards open source software both within
the federal organizations and across industry. Open
source software is a software that is voluntarily developed and extended by users specific to their organization’s needs and made freely available to all.78 For
analytic purposes, open source software allows analysts
to customize analytic processes and products specific to
their organization. Consequently, open source software
has emerged as a major cultural and economic phenomenon79 and illustrates the trend toward developing
user innovation around analytic capabilities to increase
an organization’s performance.80 This collaborative
model offered by the open source ecosystem can potentially change the analytic nature of organizations by
increasing innovation and technology adoption while
being constrained by resources.81
The transition towards open source software allows
us to operationalize and embed our analytic
approaches into systems and business processes for
more efficient analytic efforts.82 In this research, the
authors developed two forms of embedded analytics:
an open source R Package (anomalyDetection83) and
a Shiny Application which is employed by cyber analysts for operational analysis of log data.
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Figure 14. Screenshots of embedded web analytics application.

anomalyDetection R Package
anomalyDetection is an R package that provides quantitative cyber analysts the ability to effectively and efficiently implement our methodology. anomalyDetection
provides 13 functions to aid in the detection of
potential cyber anomalies. These functions employ
the methods presented in this paper and described in
Gutierrez et al.84

Shiny Application
Due to the high volume of incoming data, cyber analysts may not always have the time available to manually compute and analyze the data for anomaly
detection using the anomalyDetection R package. To
fully integrate the authors’ methodology into the workflow of cyber analysts operating on a big data platform,
a web-based embedded analytic was developed so the
analysts can execute the analytic approach efficiently
over multiple time periods and data sources. R Shiny
was used to develop this second form of embedded
analytic. Shiny is an R package that provides an elegant and powerful framework for building interactive
web applications using R. The web application provides means for the user to upload new data files,
adjust block sizes and the number of IP addresses to
consider. The web application will then perform the
analytic methodologies discussed throughout this
paper and provide results in the form of interactive

graphics and tables to help the cyber analyst detect
anomalies. This provides an efficient approach for
cyber analysts to effectively analyze significant
amounts of data while ensuring the methodological
approach is valid and consistent. Example screenshots
of the transitioned tool are presented in Figure 14.

Conclusions
Cyber attacks continue to be a growing concern for
organizations. Unfortunately, the process of analyzing
log files has, historically, been unorganized and lacked
efficient approaches. This research presented an
analyst-aided approach that makes the log file analysis
process more efficient and facilitates the identification
and analysis of potential anomalies. First, a state
vector approach was developed to facilitate the identification and analysis of anomalies in log files. Second,
multivariate statistics and graphical methods such as
the Mahalanobis distance, factor analysis, and histogram matrices were combined in an analyst centric
approach for outlier detection. Fourth, this research
introduces the breakdown distance heuristic as a
decomposition of the Mahalanobis distance, by indicating which variables and time blocks contributed
most to its value. Finally, we illustrated how open
source programming was used to operationalize our
methodology.
Consequently, this research contributes to the field
of network intrusion detection by demonstrating
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a comprehensive systems engineering approach to prepare log file data, apply multivariate and graphical
methods to narrow the search window for log file analysis, and embed the analytic process to ensure anomaly
detection approaches are reproducible and efficiently deployed.
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